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S
oftware applications integrate more and
more open-source software (OSS) to
benefit from code reuse. As a drawback,
each vulnerability discovered in bundled OSS
potentially affects the application. Upon the
disclosure of every new vulnerability, the ap-
plication vendor has to decide whether it is
exploitable in his particular usage context,
hence, whether users require an urgent ap-
plication patch containing a non-vulnerable
version of the OSS. Current decision making
is mostly based on high-level vulnerability de-
scriptions and expert knowledge, thus, effort
intense and error prone. This paper proposes
a pragmatic approach to facilitate the impact
assessment, describes a proof-of-concept for
Java, and examines one example vulnerabil-
ity as case study. The approach is indepen-
dent from specific kinds of vulnerabilities or
programming languages and can deliver im-
mediate results.
1 Introduction
The adoption of open-source software (OSS) in the
software industry has continued to grow over the past
few years and many of today’s commercial products
are shipped with a number of OSS libraries. Vulnera-
bilities of any of these OSS libraries can have consid-
erable consequences on the security of the commercial
product that bundles them. The relevance of this
problem has been acknowledged by OWASP which
included “A9-Using Components with Known Vulner-
abilities” among the Top-10 security vulnerabilities
in 2013 [1]. The disclosure in 2014 of vulnerabili-
ties such as Heartbleed1 and ShellShock2 contributed
even further to raise the awareness of the problem.
Despite the deceiving simplicity of the existing
solutions (the most obvious being: update to a more
recent, patched version), OSS libraries with known
vulnerabilities are found to be used for some time af-
ter a fixed version has been issued [2]. Updating to a
more recent, non-vulnerable version of a library repre-
sents a straightforward solution at development time.
However, the problem can be considerably more diffi-
cult to handle when a vulnerable OSS library is part
1http://heartbleed.com/
2https://shellshocker.net/
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of a system that has already been deployed and made
available to its users. In the case of large enterprise
systems that serve business-critical functions, any
change (including updates) may cause system down-
time and comes with the risk that new unforeseen
issues arise. For this reason, software vendors need
to carefully assess whether an application requires an
urgent application patch to update an OSS library,
or whether the update can be done as part of the
application’s regular release cycle.
The key question that vendors have to answer is
whether or not a given vulnerability, that was found
in an OSS library used in one of their products, is
indeed exploitable given the particular use that such
a product makes of that library [3]. If the answer
is positive, an application patch must be produced,
and its installation needs to be triggered for all exist-
ing deployments of the application. If the answer is
negative, the library update can be scheduled as part
of the regular release cycle, without causing extra
efforts related to urgent patch production by vendors
and patch installation by users. The current practice
of assessing the potential impact of a vulnerability in
OSS is time-consuming and error-prone. Vulnerabili-
ties are typically documented with short, high-level
textual descriptions expressed in natural language; at
the same time, the assessment demands considerable
expert knowledge about the application-specific use
of the library in question. Consequences of wrong as-
sessments can be expensive: if the developer wrongly
assesses that a given vulnerability is not exploitable,
application users remain exposed to attackers. If
she wrongly judges that it is exploitable, the effort
of developing, testing, shipping, and deploying the
patch to the customers’ systems is spent in vain.
This paper presents a pragmatic approach that
contributes to simplify the decision making. We do
so by automatically producing (whenever possible)
concrete evidences supporting the case for urgent
patching. More specifically we assess whether an
application uses (portion of) a library for which a
security fix has been issued in response to a vulner-
ability. The approach seamlessy integrates in the
usual development workflow without requiring addi-
tional effort from developers and is independent of
programming languages and vulnerability types.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents our approach and a generic architecture
that supports it. Section 3 describes our prototypi-
cal implemention and its application to a case study.
Section 4 outlines observations regarding the inte-
gration and quality of information stemming from
different sources. Section 5 presents related literature.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Approach
Concept
In order to assess whether or not a given vulnerability
in an OSS library is relevant for a particular applica-
tion, we consider the corresponding security patch,
i.e., the set of changes performed in the source code
of the library in response to the vulnerability. Our
approach is than based on the following pragmatic
assumption:
(A1) Whenever an application that includes a library
(known to be vulnerable) executes a fragment of
the library that would be updated in a security
patch, there exists a significant risk that the
vulnerability can be exploited.
The underlying idea is that if programming con-
structs3 that would be changed by the patch are
used, than the application is using code involved in
the vulnerable part of the library. Therefore, we
collect execution traces of applications, and compare
those with changes that would be introduced by the
security patches of known vulnerabilities in order to
detect whether “critical” library code is executed.
Figure 1 illustrates the approach graphically: The
change-list Cij represents the set of all programming
constructs of OSS component i that were modified,
added or deleted as part of the security patch for
vulnerability j. Change-lists can be computed as
soon as a security patch has been produced for a
vulnerability. Patches can be assumed available at
the time vulnerabilities become public in the case of
responsible disclosure. The trace-list Ta represents
the set of all programming constructs, either part
of application a or any of its bundled libraries, that
were executed at least once during the runtime of
application a. The collection of traces can be done at
many different times, starting from unit tests until
the application is deployed for productive use.
The intersection Cij ∩ Ta comprises all those pro-
gramming constructs that are both subject to secu-
rity patch j and have been executed in the context
of application a. Following assumption (A1), a non-
empty intersection Cij∩Ta indicates that a newly dis-
closed vulnerability is highly relevant, due to the risk
of exploitability. An empty intersection, on the other
3We use the language-agnostic term “programming construct”
to refer to structural elements such as methods, construc-
tors, functions and so on.
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hand, may result from insufficient coverage, hence, it
does not automatically render a vulnerability irrele-
vant. Coverage is described by the intersection of the
sets Ta ∩ Sa, where Sa is the set of all programming
constructs belonging to the application itself. The
larger the intersection, the better the coverage, and
the greater the confidence that constructs belonging
to Cij cannot be reached.
Library versions can be disregarded, provided that
the traces were collected before the release of a se-
curity patch and that all existing library versions
are affected by the vulnerability. In other cases (in
particular if traces are more recent than a patch, and
if the corresponding constructs exist in both vulner-
able and patched library version) one has to identify
and compare the version of the library producing the
trace with the ones affected by the vulnerability.
Our approach is not immune to reporting false-
positives and false-negatives. False-positives occur
if a vulnerability is not exploitable despite a non-
empty intersection Cij ∩ Ta, which is due to the fact
that exploitability can depend on many other con-
ditions, e.g., the presence of sanitization techniques
in the application or specific configuration settings.
False-negatives occur if vulnerabilities are exploitable
despite an empty intersection Cij ∩ Ta, which can
result from insufficient coverage, a problem shared
with many techniques relying on dynamic execution
(as opposed to static analysis). The silver-lining is
that the approach is entirely independent of pro-
gramming languages or types of vulnerabilities and
it can provide immediate results. Intuitively, we
expect that developers are convinced to update a
library when presented with a non-empty intersec-
tion Cij ∩ Ta, i.e., traces of programming constructs
that are subject to a security patch. In any case, the
information collected is valuable to simplify further
analysis, complementing the high-level vulnerability
description expressed in natural language in pub-
licly available vulnerability databases, such as the
National Vulnerability Database.
Architecture.
Figure 2 illustrates a generic architecture that sup-
ports our approach. Components depicted in white
belong to the proposed solution and require an im-
plementation, while components depicted in grey
represent the solution’s environment. A specific im-
plemention for Java and related tooling is described
in Section 3.
The Assessment Engine on top is responsible for
storing and aggregating the three sets of Figure 1.
It also presents assessment results concerning the
relevance of vulnerabilities to the security expert of
the respective application.
The Patch Analyzer is triggered upon the publica-
tion of a new vulnerability for an open-source library.
It interacts with the respective Versioning Control
System (VCS), identifies all programming constructs
changed to fix the vulnerability, and uploads their
signatures to the central Assessment Engine. This
change-list is built by comparing the vulnerable and
patched revision of all relevant source code files of the
library. The corresponding commit revisions can be
obtained from the vulnerability database, searched
in the commit log, or specified manually.
The Runtime Tracer collects execution traces of
programming constructs, and uploads them to the
central engine. This is achieved by injecting instru-
mentation code into all programming constructs of
the application itself and all the bundled libraries.
The instrumentation can be done dynamically, dur-
ing the actual runtime, or statically, prior to the
application’s deployment. The former can guarantee
the tracing of all programming constructs used at
runtime including, e.g., libraries included at runtime
and parts of the runtime environment. Its major
drawback is the impact on application startup, in
particular if many contructs need to be loaded be-
fore the applicaton becomes available to its users, as
in the case of application containers. Static instru-
mentation does not impact the application startup
time and can be used in cases where the runtime
environment cannot be configured for dynamic in-
strumentation, e.g., in PaaS environments. However,
it cannot guarantee the coverage of programming
constructs used at runtime.
The Source Code Analyzer scans the source code
of the application, identifies all its programming
constructs and uploads their signatures as well as an
application identifier to the central engine.
Note that the above-described components run at
different points in time. Source Code Analyzer and
Runtime Tracer are expected to run continuously
during different phases of the application develop-
ment lifecycle and their results are kept even after
the release of the application to its customers. Once
the Patch Analyzer is triggered, typically after the
release of a patch for a vulnerable library, the assess-
ment result is immediately available thanks to the
comparison of the newly collected change-lists with
the previously collected traces.
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Figure 1: Main concept
Figure 2: Generic Solution Architecture
3 Proof-of-concept
This section describes our current implementation
of the approach and the architecture presented in
Section 2. We illustrate its application to CVE-2014-
0050 as case study.
Implementation
The current prototype supports the assessment of vul-
nerabilities of Java components and is implemented
by using technologies that can be seamlessy inte-
grated in typical Java development and build envi-
ronments based on Apache Maven.
The Assessment Engine is realized by means of a
SAP Hana database where the change-list, trace-list
and programming constructs are stored and manipu-
lated. The results are accessible via a web frontend
(see Figure 4).
The Patch Analyzer is implemented as a Java
stand-alone application. It interacts with version
control systems (VCS) (Git and Subversion in our
current implementation) by means of the JGit4 and
SVNKit5 Java libraries. Such libraries are used to re-
trieve the code for the patch and vulnerable revisions
(i.e., the revision preceeding the patched one). The
4http://eclipse.org/jgit/
5http://svnkit.com/
ANTLR6 library is used for building the parse tree
of the Java files to be compared in order to obtain
the change-list.
The Runtime Tracer requires the injection of code
into each programming construct of the application
and its libraries. The instrumentation (both static
and dynamic) is realized using Javassist7. Dynamic
instrumentation was found suitable for unit tests,
executed by individual developers and during contin-
uous integration. Static instrumentation is instead
suited for integration and end-user acceptance tests
performed on dedicated systems. In particular, if the
application is deployed in application containers such
as Apache Tomcat, static instrumentations allows to
avoid the performance impact on startup time, which
is caused by the significant number of classes loaded
before the container and its application become avail-
able. Moreover, static instrumentation is also useful
in case Java Runtime Environment (JRE) options
cannot be accessed or changed to enable dynamic in-
strumentation, e.g., when using Platform as a Service
(PaaS) offerings. In either cases, whenever the appli-
cation is executed, the instrumentation code added is
responsible for collecting and uploading traces to the
6http://www.antlr.org/
7http://www.csg.ci.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~chiba/
javassist/
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central engine. Note that the collection and upload is
only done upon the first invocation of the respective
programming construct which significantly reduces
the performance overhead. The limited impact on
application performance has as goal to enable the
trace collection during everyday testing activities.
The Source Code Analyzer is realized by means
of a Maven plugin. As for the Patch Analyzer it
uses the ANTLR library to parse the Java classes.
The result is the collection of the signature of every
programming construct belonging to the application
itself. The Maven identifier (composed of group id,
artifact id, and version) is used as identifier of the
application to set the context for the analysis, i.e.,
it represents the application a to define the sets Sa
and Ta of programming constructs and trace-list (see
Figure 1).
Case-study: CVE-2014-0050.
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is a
comprehensive, publicly available database for known
vulnerabilities that are disclosed in a responsible man-
ner, i.e., for which a patch has been made available
at the time of the vulnerability publication. It also
includes the information regarding affected products.
In particular, the Common Vulnerabilities and Ex-
posures (CVE) and Common Platform Enumeration
(CPE) standards are used to identify the vulnerabil-
ity and the affected products, respectively.
CVE-2014-0050 8 describes a vulnerability in
Apache FileUpload 9 as follows: “Multipart-
Stream.java in Apache Commons FileUpload before
1.3.1, as used in Apache Tomcat, JBoss Web, and
other products, allows remote attackers to cause a
denial of service (infinite loop and CPU consump-
tion) via a crafted Content-Type header that bypasses
a loop’s intended exit conditions.”
Upon disclosure of the vulnerability, any developer
using Apache FileUpload needs to judge whether her
application is affected. Current practices require her
to rely on the textual description for taking a decision.
However, it is not straighforward to assess whether
the Java class MultipartStream (referenced to in the
description) is used in the scope of an application. In
fact it may be used either directly (i.e., instanciated
in the source code of the application) or indirectly
within other classes of the libraries which are directly
8http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2014-0050
9http://commons.apache.org/proper/
commons-fileupload/
used.
The application used in our case study is a
sample Web application, com.research.vulas:vulas-
testapp:0.0.1-SNAPSHOT, which performs various
operations on compressed archives. Figure 3 shows
assessment results for several vulnerabilities after
the execution of both JUnit and integration tests
of the Web application as well as the computation
of change-lists. The first two vulnerabilities, includ-
ing CVE-2014-0050, are marked as relevant because
constructs part of the change-list (i.e., subject to
the security patch) have been executed in its vul-
nerable version. CVE-2011-1498, CVE-2012-6153,
and CVE-2014-3529 are marked as irrelevant since
non-vulnerable releases of the respective libraries are
used. For CVE-2014-3577 and CVE-2014-3574 the
assessment result shows that the vulnerable release is
used but no traces for the change-list were observed.
More in detail, the table at the bottom of Fig-
ure 4 shows the change-list Cij where i is Apache
FileUpload and j the vulnerability CVE-2014-0050.
In this case, the intersection Cij ∩ Ta is not empty,
but contains the constructor of the Java class Multi-
partStream. The exclamation mark in the “Traced”
column highlights that its execution was observed
–at the time shown in the tooltip– during application
tests.
The Patch Analyzer computed the change-list us-
ing the URL of the VCS of Apache FileUpload and
the revision number of the patch, which is provided
by NVD in one of the references of CVE-2014-0050.
As the used programming construct in Figure 4
was modified as part of the patch (marked as MOD
in the figure), it is present both in the vulnerable
and patched version of the library. Moreover, the
experiment was done for a rather old vulnerability,
hence, the traces are more recent than the security
patch itself. As a result, it is necessary to identify
the version of the library in use, and compare it with
the ones affected by the vulnerability.
This is preferably done by means of Maven identi-
fiers and, if this is not possible, CPEs. In particular,
we search the Maven Central repository (i.e., the
default repository for dependency management with
Maven) for the SHA-1 of the archive from which a
class was loaded at runtime and, if a match is found,
we obtain the version of the used library as well as
the information about all existing versions.
The products affected by a vulnerability are iden-
tified by interacting with the VCS of the respective
library. For that purpose, we analyze so-called tags,
which are a common means for marking all those
repository elements that constitute a given relrease
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Figure 3: Analysis overview for the sample application
–at least in case of the widely-used versioning control
systems Apache Subversion and CVS. In more detail,
we identify all tags applied prior to the security patch
in question, and parse the Maven project files that
existed at that time.
In case of VCS other than Apache Subversion and
CVS, we resort to the NVD for establishing the af-
fected versions of a given vulnerability. The NVD
uses CPE names, mainly composed of the vendor,
product and version information, to identify all af-
fected products. In order to establish if the used
library is affected by the CVE we check if its ver-
sion is among those listed for the affected CPEs. In
general, the use of CPE names is considered as a
fallback only, since the matching of CPE vendor and
product names to Maven identifiers is ambiguous (cf.
Section 4).
Information about library releases is displayed in
the upper table of Figure 4. It shows that the used
library, i.e., apache commons fileupload 1.2.2, is in-
deed affected by the vulnerability: there existed
a corresponding tag that has been applied prior
to the commit of the security fix. It also shows
the latest, non-vulnerable release, i.e., apache com-
mons fileupload 1.3.1. By updating to the latest
release, the risk of being vulnerable can be addressed.
Figure 4: Analysis details for CVE-2014-0050
As the web application of our case study runs
within the Apache Tomcat application container, we
opted for the static instrumentation in order to avoid
the impact of dynamic instrumentation on the con-
tainer’s initial startup time. The trace of the patched
programming construct was collected by using inte-
gration tests on the interface for uploading files of the
instrumented application. Intuitively, we perceive
that unit and integration tests are complementary
means for collecting traces. In particular, the focus
of unit tests on the business logic of fine-granular
components does not cover components involved in
the application’s main I/O channels, many of which
rely on OSS libraries, e.g., Apache FileUpload, Http-
Client or Struts.
For CVE-2014-0050 an exploit exists as a Ruby
script in the Exploit-DB, i.e., an archive of exploits
for known vulnerabilities (http://www.exploit-db.
com/exploits/31615/). By manually running it, we
observed that assumption (A1) of Section 2 holds in
our case study, i.e., the vulnerability is exploitable in
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Figure 5: Information about archives declared and/or
traced
the given application context even though only one
programming construct belonging to the change-list
has been executed.
Other than assessing vulnerabilities, the prototype
offers two other views:
The first view shows all archives used by the appli-
cation under analysis (cf. Figure 5), either because
they have been declared using Maven or because
they have been observed during application tests (i.e.,
classes where loaded from those archives). Archives
whose SHA-1 is not known to the Maven Central
are highlighted (commons-io-1.3.2.jar in the exam-
ple), and so are archives that have not been declared
but whose execution was observed during application
tests. The former may indicate the use of a tampered
archive, the latter bad development practice.
The second view displays the function coverage of
application constructs as described in Section 2, ag-
gregated on the level of Java packages (cf. Figure 6).
Moreover, it shows the function coverage for archives
used by the application, aggregated on archive level.
4 Data integration problems
Our approach requires the integration of informa-
tion stemming from different sources, e.g., vulnera-
bility databases, VCS for managing the code base
of OSS, and public OSS repositories (e.g., Maven
Central10 in case of our Java prototype). During
10http://search.maven.org
Figure 6: Function coverage for application constructs
and archives
our experiments, we found that the integration is
hindered by several problems, each one requiring
ad-hoc, technology-specific solutions. Such problems
hamper—in general—the automation of OSS vulner-
ability management.
Non-uniform reporting of products affected
by a vunerability.
The NVD uses the CPE standard for enumerating
components affected by a vulnerability. In our ex-
periments, we observed a non-uniform practice of
assigning CPEs to vulnerabilities in OSS libraries.
In some cases only the CPE of the respective library
is mentioned. As an example, the affected compo-
nents for CVE-2012-209811 are versions of Apache
Commons Compress before 1.4.1.
cpe:/a:apache:commons-compress
In other cases also the CPEs of applications making
use of the library are listed. This is the case for
11Algorithmic complexity vulnerability in the sort-
ing algorithms in bzip2 compressing stream
(BZip2CompressorOutputStream) in Apache Com-
mons Compress before 1.4.1 allows remote attackers to
cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a file
with many repeating inputs.
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CVE-2014-0050, whose affected components include
not only Apache FileUpload,
cpe:/a:apache:commons_fileupload
but also several versions of Apache Tomcat,
cpe:/a:apache:tomcat
which is just one out of many applications using
this library. As mentioned in the textual descrip-
tion of the CVE (cf. Section 3), JBoss Web, and
other products are also affected, though, not listed
as CPEs.
The above CPEs are written in the URI binding
form. We made use of a subset of the supported fields,
i.e., type a to denote an application, vendor apache,
product commons-compress, commons_fileupload,
and tomcat. It is important to notice that CPEs do
not provide an immediate means to identify libraries.
Vulnerability and dependency management
make use of different naming schemes and
nomenclatures.
There exist many language-dependent technologies
and nomenclatures for identifying libraries and man-
agaging dependencies at development and build time
(e.g., Maven for Java), none of which maps straight-
forwardly to CPE. As an example consider the
Apache HTTP Client library. Maven identifiers are
of the form
GroupId=org.apache.httpcomponents
ArtifactId=httpclient
for each release as of 4.0. CVE-2012-6153 affects
Apache Commons HttpClient before 4.2.3 and the
CPEs listed as affected products are of the form
cpe:/a:apache:commons-httpclient
While a human can easily recognize the mapping,
this is not the case for an automated solution. The
problem is made even worse by the fact that Maven
identifiers and CPEs may change for newer releases.
As a matter of fact the syntax commons-httpclient
that is used in the above CPE was also used as Maven
group and artifact id for older releases (before 4.0).
Moreover, there exists no unambigous, language-
independent way for uniquely identifying libraries
once they are bundled and installed as part of an
application. Our prototype computes the SHA-1
of Java archives and performs a lookup in Maven
central: an ad-hoc solution that fails if the bundled
library has been compiled with a different compiler
than the library available in the public repository.
Vulnerabilities and VCS information of the
respective security patch are not linked in
a systematic and machine-readable
fashion.
The change-list computation requires as input the
URLs of VCS and commit numbers. The Patch
Analyzer of our prototype uses two strategies for dis-
covering them: (i) pattern matching for identifying
VCS information in CVE references and (ii) search
for CVE identifiers in VCS commit logs. While suc-
cessful in case of CVE-2014-0050 and many other
vulnerabilities, they still represent ad-hoc solutions
depending on the discipline of developers and the
quality of CVE entries. In particular, both strategies
are successfull for CVE-2014-0050: (i) the VCS
http://svn.apache.org/r1565143
is listed among the CVE references; (ii) the commit
log for revision 1565143 contains the CVE identifier:
Fix CVE-2014-0050. Specially crafted input
can trigger a DoS if ... This prevents the
DoS.
However in other cases different practices are used.
As an example CVE-2012-2098 affecting Apache
Commons Compress does not reference the VCS revi-
sion(s) fixing the vulnerability, nor the VCS commit
log systematically references the CVE. In this exam-
ple the revisions fixing the vulnerability are listed
in a webpage of the Commons Compress project
dedicated to security reports 12.
5 Related work
With the increased adoption of open-source com-
ponents in commercial products, the attention to
the potential risks stemming from this practice has
increased correspondingly. More specifically, the
problem of evaluating the impact of vulnerabilities of
open-source (and more generally, of third-party) com-
ponents has attracted significant attention among
researchers [4, 5] and practitioners [2, 1]. Several
approaches tackle the problem of vulnerability im-
pact assessment by examining the system statically,
in order to determine a measure of risk, as in [6]
where the authors consider the relation between the
entry points of the subject system (the potential at-
tack surface) and the attack target (the vulnerable
code). Younis et. al [3], elaborating on that idea,
12http://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-
compress/security.html
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proposed a similar approach that also measures the
ratio between damage potential and attack effort in
order to estimate how motivated an attacker needs
to be when targeting a particular point of the attack
surface.
Our approach is complementary to these, in that
our goal is to observe real executions of a system (as
opposed to analyzing its structure and call graph)
in order to detect whether actual executions were
observed that touched a part of the code that is
known to be vulnerable. Judging how likely is the
exploitation of vulnerabilities that were not covered
by concrete execution is not in the scope of this work
(although we do plan to include that aspect in our
future research).
Several tools have been proposed to help detect
the use of vulnerable libraries, such as the OWASP
Dependency-Check13 or the Victims Project14. Both
support the check of whether a project depends on
libraries for which there are any known, publicly
disclosed, vulnerabilities. Similarly to ours, these
tools are realized as Maven plugins to minimize the
barrier to adoption. They differ from our approach
because their goal is to identify whether a vulnerable
library is included in a project, whereas we concen-
trate on detecting whether the vulnerable portion
of the library can be actually executed as part of
the container project, a question that is particularly
relevant for released applications.
6 Future directions
Up to now, we have used the current implementation
of our approach to a limited set of sample projects.
The evaluation we could make was only preliminary,
but the feedback we received from the the early
adopters of our tool (develoment units internal to
our company) indicates clearly that the problem we
are tackling is perceived as timely and extremely rel-
evant in practice. That feedback also highlights the
importance of several outstanding problems which
demand further investigation. In this section we sum-
marize the future directions of our research, which
will be the topic of future works.
Accuracy of the analysis
One inherent limitation of our approach, as most
existing approaches to vulnerability analysis, is that
13https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_
Check
14https://victi.ms/, https://github.com/victims
it is neither sound nor complete. In particular, the
reliability of our assessment is heavily dependent
on the coverage achieved through executions (e.g.,
obtained by testing) of the subject system and its
libraries. This has two important consequences: one
is related to the nature of the judgments that one
can draw based on testing; the other is related to the
problems that can arise when a test suite constructed
for functional testing is used as the basis of a security
assessment.
Obviously, when execution coverage is poor, it may
happen that a vulnerability is not deemed relevant
just because no observed path reached the vulnerable
code. This says nothing about whether such path
would be feasible in practice. Furthermore, even
when relying on a well-written (functional) test suite
that achieves high-coverage, there might still be cor-
ner cases – not considered in functional tests – that
are potentially relevant from a security standpoint
and that an attacker could exploit.
The first point can be addressed by using test suites
that achieve good coverage and that therefore reduce
the chances that obvious problematic execution paths
go unnoticed.
Regarding the second point (which can also benefit
from testing if the functional test suite is augmented
with explicit tests for corner cases and negative tests),
we feel it would be tackled more effectively by com-
bining our current test-based approach with static
analysis. By analysing the source code of the target
program and its libraries, we could determine with
some approximation (e.g., constructing the combined
call graph), whether it is at all possible to reach vul-
nerable code from the application code.
In certain particular cases, this method could pro-
vide very strong evidence that the vulnerable code is
unreachable, and as such it would complement nicely
our test-based method with provides very strong evi-
dence (a proof, indeed) in the complementary case,
that is when vulnerable code is indeed reachable.
This technique would still need to cope with some
degree of approximation. A study of the interplay
of test-based analysis and static analysis will also
require to investigate which types of flow analysis
are best suited to provide a good balance between
reliability of the results and performance, especially
when taking into account the the complexity of large
real-world applications.
Scalability to large projects
While we do not have conclusive evidence nor quan-
titative figures to offer at this time, the performance
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observed in our preliminary tests is promising. We
believe that the performance penalty that our tool
imposes on the build process would acceptable in
most practical cases. As a future work, we plan to
conduct a systematic study of the performance of
our tool, by using it in large commercial applica-
tions with complex build structure and hundreds of
dependencies.
Experiments to validate the assumptions
underlying our approach
The basic assumption on which this work is based (see
Sec. 1) seems sensible based on what we observed in a
limited set of sample projects both in the open-source
and in industrial projects. However, its rigorous
validation is a prerequisite for drawing more realiable
conclusions about the quality of our approach. This
validation will require examining a larger number of
projects and compare the results of our analysis with
the actual exploitability of vulnerable libraries in the
context of those projects.
Tackling the data integration problems
Our approach heavily relies on data coming from an
heterogeneous set of sources, which include vulnera-
bility databases (such as the NVD) and source code
repositories.
Based on our experience, we believe that, despite
the growing attention that both researchers and prac-
titioners dedicate to the topic of automated vulner-
ability management, the gap to be filled in is still
quite large. A key problem that approaches like ours
have to face is how to reliably relate CVE entries
with the affected software products and the corre-
sponding source code repository, down to the level of
accurately matching vulnerability reports with the
code changes that provide a fix for them.
This information is currently unavailable, and ob-
taining it proved to be extremely difficult.
We are currently adoption ad-hoc solutions to
these problems. For example, we are manually con-
structing a curated list of widely used open-source
projects and their respective code repositories. This
approach has the obvious drawback of requiring man-
ual effort both to build and maintain the list; fur-
thermore the coverage is limited to a large but non-
exhaustive set of projects. Similarly, we are using
ad-hoc mechanisms to determine the correspondence
between release numbers (as mentioned in CVEs) to
commit identifiers in source code repositories.
As a future work, we will investigate ways to im-
prove these solutions a we will study possible alter-
native methods.
Integrating continuous vulnerability
assessment in continuous integration
systems
Our approach, when considered as part of the overall
software development lifecycle, has a very natural
application in continuous build and integration sys-
tems. When included in such systems, our tool can
collect traces on a regular basis and therefore can of-
fer timely notifications when one or more of the used
libraries are found to be affected by a vulnerability
report.
At the time of writing, we are initiating the work
to adapt our prototype to run as part of Jenkins
builds. As a future work, we intend to complete
this implementation and to evaluate it when used in
large development projects (e.g., with over a hundred
libraries).
7 Conclusion
This paper presented a pragmatic approach to an-
swer one important and time-critical question: Does
a vulnerability in bundled OSS libraries affect an
application? Our approach helps to assess whether
urgent patching is needed in response to a vulner-
ability. It is generic with regard to programming
languages and types of vulnerabilities, and can be
seamlessly integrated into industry-scale build and
integration systems.
This paper presented both the conceptual ap-
proach and a concrete implementation as a tool,
whose functionality was demonstrated using an illus-
trative example.
Contact information. The authors can
be contacted via e-mail at their addresses:
firstname.lastname AT sap.com. Comments and
feedback on this paper are very appreciated.
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